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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Rodney King was about police abuse, O.J. was about police incom-
petence, and Rampart is about police corruption.1 
It’s not a bad apple. The barrel itself is rotten.2 
 A little over a decade ago, the videotaped beating of Rodney King 
merely confirmed what many Los Angeles residents had long since 
determined—the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) was a cor-
rupt, racist, and even brutal police force.3 For the rest of the country, 
however, there was a search for some way to explain something that, 
until then, people could all too easily ignore—for the millions of 
Americans who had never been on the wrong side of the thin blue 
                                                                                                                    
 1. 10 Years After King Beating, LA Police Still Struggle with Tarnished Reputation, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 3, 2001, at 5 (quoting Professor Laurie Levenson). 
 2. The Simpson Legacy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at S3 (quoting Michael Zinzun, Di-
rector of the Coalition Against Police Abuse, commenting on the problem of police miscon-
duct in the LAPD), available at 1995 WL 9833684. 
 3. See Sheryl Stolberg, The Times Poll 31% of Angelenos Say Gates Should Quit 
Now, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1991, at A1 (reporting that when Los Angeles residents were 
polled shortly after the King beating, twenty-nine percent said that LAPD policies were to 
blame for the incident, sixty-five percent said that racism among the LAPD’s officers was 
at least fairly common, and another sixty-eight percent said that brutality in the LAPD 
was common), available at 1991 WL 2306537. 
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line, police misconduct was someone else’s problem.4 Now, however, 
people could hardly flip through the channels fast enough to avoid 
the image of four white police officers repeatedly clubbing an un-
armed black man.5 And then, of course, there were the riots. For a 
short time, national attention was focused on the issue of police mis-
conduct. It became, in a sense, everyone’s problem. 
 Initially, the outlook for reform was positive. The Christopher 
Commission, which was created to explore the scope of abuse in the 
LAPD, determined that the King beating was by no means an anom-
aly.6 As such, the Commission made several specific recommenda-
tions aimed at systemic reform.7 Not all of the recommendations, 
though, were implemented.8 And as the public’s interest in police 
misconduct waned, the LAPD grew complacent.9 It seemed miscon-
duct was once again merely a marginal problem. Even the King beat-
ing was, to some, little more than a case of a few cops who went too 
far—apart from these few bad apples, the LAPD was otherwise a 
good police force.10 That, however, was before the Rampart Scandal.  
 In August 1998, the arrest of police officer Rafael Perez began the 
unraveling of what has since been termed the worst scandal in the 
history of the LAPD.11 Perez was accused of using his position as a 
member of the LAPD’s Rampart Division CRASH12 unit to obtain and 
                                                                                                                    
 4. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1991, at 77-78 
(1992) (reporting that a majority of Americans did not believe police brutality occurred 
where they live). 
 5. The racial element of the King beating was, of course, one of its more disturbing 
aspects. Its parallel to some of the more egregious instances of racial injustice in American 
history was virtually impossible to ignore. See Mary Maxwell Thomas, The African Ameri-
can Male: Communication Gap Converts Justice into “Just Us” System, 13 HARV. BLACK-
LETTER L.J. 1, 7 (1997). 
 6. See INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COM-
MISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 25-74 (1991); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Rampart Scandal: Policing the Criminal Justice System: An Independ-
ent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the Ram-
part Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 561 (2001). 
 7. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 562. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Edward Lazarus, The L.A.P.D. Scandal: A Testament to the Failure of Police Re-
form, FindLaw (Oct. 5, 2000), at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/lazarus/20001005.html 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2003). 
 10. See, e.g., Forum Addresses Police Brutality, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 15, 1991, at A15 (re-
porting the view among some participants at a forum sponsored by the California League 
of Cities that the issue of misconduct was overblown by the media), available at 1991 WL 
4214249. 
 11. Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 549.  
 12. The acronym CRASH stands for “Community Resources Against Street Hood-
lums.” L.A. BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS, REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEPENDENT 
REVIEW PANEL 1 (2000), available at http://www.lacity.org/oig/rirprpt.pdf (last visited Aug. 
23, 2003). 
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sell illegal narcotics.13 Conceding these charges, Perez struck a deal 
with prosecutors in which he agreed to disclose his knowledge of mis-
conduct by other Rampart officers.14 His testimony revealed a perva-
sive pattern of corruption in the LAPD’s Rampart Division.15 As 
many as seventy officers were implicated in misconduct ranging from 
murder to drinking on the job.16 Over one hundred sentences were 
overturned as a consequence of Perez’s testimony, including that of 
Javier Ovando, who was shot, framed, and testified against by Perez 
and his partner.17 At Perez’s sentencing hearing, he apologized for 
his mistakes, confessing to his own weaknesses, but also pointing to 
a culture in his former department where the “lines between right 
and wrong became fuzzy and indistinct. . . . and the ends seemed to 
justify the means.”18 
 If Perez’s allegations were true, Rampart misconduct was much 
more than a case of a good cop gone bad or the doings of a rotten ap-
ple in an otherwise pristine barrel.19 Rather, as Perez suggested, 
misconduct so far-reaching and severe must surely have its root in a 
larger culture of corruption.20 After all, this was the LAPD—the same 
police force who nearly beat Rodney King to death, the same police 
force whose chief remarked in a similar case that the victim was 
lucky21 to have escaped, and the same police force who defended kill-
ing African-Americans through the use of a special chokehold be-
cause their necks were different from normal people.22 The bad apple 
                                                                                                                    
 13. Frontline: LAPD Blues (PBS television broadcast, May 15, 2001) (transcript), at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lapd/etc/script.html (last visited Aug. 
23, 2003) [hereinafter LAPD Blues]; see also The Rampart Scandal: Genesis of a Scandal, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2000, at A18, available at 2000 WL 2234602. 
 14. See LAPD Blues, supra note 13. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Frontline: LAPD Blues, Rampart Scandal, Rafael Perez’s Statement to the Court 
(excerpt) (PBS television broadcast, May 15, 2001), at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/shows/lapd/scandal/statement.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2003). 
 19. For discussion of this phenomenon, see Susan Bandes, Tracing the Pattern of No 
Pattern: Stories of Police Brutality, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 665 passim (2001); see also Paul 
Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Control-
ling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1481-82 (1993) (discussing 
whether just a few bad apples (police officers) are behind the abuse, or whether it is the en-
tire department). 
 20. Even the term scandal, some suggest, fails to capture the real story of corruption 
in police departments like the LAPD—rather than a variation from the norm, they contend 
that misconduct in the LAPD is the norm. See Bandes, supra note 19, at 672-73. 
 21. Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1510.   
 22. David Shaw, Media Failed to Examine Alleged LAPD Abuses; Press: Eulia Love 
Case Brought a Tougher Look. But Complaints About Patterns of Use of Force Weren’t Ex-
plored, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1992, at A1, available at 1992 WL 2909305. Other examples of 
LAPD brutality include the Dalton Avenue Raid in 1988, and the killing of Eulia Love, an 
elderly black woman, because she refused to turn off her gas. Id. 
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theory could only explain so much.23 Consequently, in the wake of the 
Rampart Scandal, there appeared to emerge, as one commentator 
put it, “a rare window of opportunity to institute reform at the 
LAPD.”24  
 On the other hand, some of the same factors that kept reform at 
bay following the Rodney King beating would have to be overcome for 
systemic change to be effected.25 Most significantly, Javier Ovando 
and other Rampart victims, like King, were minorities.26 Thus, their 
prospects for extra-judicial remedies were relatively slight.27 And, 
while theory might have suggested that any breakdown in democracy 
would simply be compensated through judicial relief,28 in reality, the 
courthouse has steadily closed its doors on victims of police miscon-
duct.29  
 Most notably, the courts have restricted the use of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983,30 the principal remedy for victims in police misconduct 
claims.31 On its face, § 1983 appears to be a powerful remedy for re-
dressing the misconduct of police departments and their officers. 
Prudential restrictions, statutes of limitations, heightened pleading 
standards, and qualified immunity often function, however, to guard 
municipal actors (or the municipalities themselves) from liability.32 
                                                                                                                    
 23. For further discussion, or rather, critique, of the bad apple theory of police mis-
conduct, see Bandes, supra note 19. 
 24. Charles Rappleye & John Seeley, Righting the Ship, L.A. WKLY., Sept. 15, 2000, 
at 15 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky). 
 25. In the ten years since Rodney King’s beating, promises of reform have become a 
staple of political rhetoric in Los Angeles. See John Corrigan, Legacy of a Beating; the Prov-
ing Ground; After Rodney King and Four Cops Made History in Lake View Terrace, the 
LAPD’s Foothill Division Was Ordered to Reinvent Itself. Today, Change—Inertia—Are 
Evident., L.A. TIMES MAG., Mar. 4, 2001, at 20. Thus far, however, a decade’s worth of 
rhetoric has done little, if anything, to stem the tide of police misconduct. Id. 
 26. This is especially true, as later noted, when  minorities are defined not only as Af-
rican-Americans or Hispanics but as suspected and convicted criminals or, similarly, gang 
members. See Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain 
Courts?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 923, 928 (2001). For discussion of the disproportionate impact 
of police misconduct on racial and economic minorities, see, for example, Susan Bandes, 
Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1305 (1999) 
(“One of the salient characteristics of police brutality is that it is largely practiced on poor 
and minority groups . . . .”). 
 27. See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1462-71. 
 28. Id. at 1504. 
 29. Id. 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 31. For discussion on the progress of institutional reforms, see Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Commentary, To Prevent a Repeat of Rampart, Fix More Than the LAPD, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
25, 2003, pt. 2, at 15. This Comment also addresses the prospect of law enforcement, as op-
posed to civil redress, as a means to effect reform. See infra Part III.A. Consistent with 
what this Comment posits, these efforts have met marginal success thus far. See Charles 
Rappleye, Dismissing Rampart, L.A. WKLY., Dec. 6, 2002, at 23; Harrison Sheppard, LAPD 
Yet to Comply with Consent Decree, DAILY NEWS L.A., Feb. 1, 2003, at N5. 
 32. See Lee v. Gates, No. CV0103085DTCTX, 2001 WL 1098070 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 
2001) (unpublished order). 
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In many cases, then, the most that police misconduct victims might 
hope for is some degree of compensation33 for their injuries.34 For the 
most part, those aspects of the system that facilitate the misconduct 
remain intact.  
 It was out of this context that victims of the Rampart Scandal 
turned to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO).35 Initially, some legal commentators put forth ambitious 
claims regarding both the motivations behind as well as the potential 
of using RICO in police misconduct suits.36 The focal point was 
RICO’s provision for treble damages, which some predicted would re-
sult in huge windfalls for misconduct victims and their lawyers and 
potentially crippling liability for municipalities.37 Under RICO, how-
ever, only injuries to business or property are compensable.38 Thus, 
one does not arrive at treble damages simply by tripling the damages 
awarded in non-RICO suits.39 For instance, if a plaintiff’s only inju-
ries are pain and suffering, treble damages mean nothing—three 
times zero is, after all, zero. And, since many victims of police mis-
conduct are socioeconomic minorities,40 who rarely own businesses or 
property of significant value, it is unlikely that RICO’s treble dam-
ages provision would lead to the huge recoveries that are common in 
other RICO suits. Even assuming that income or lost opportunity for 
income are property under RICO, actual damages are still unlikely to 
                                                                                                                    
 33. For discussion of the myth of actual damages and the greater ability of treble 
damages to make victims whole, see G. Robert Blakey, Of Characterization and Other Mat-
ters: Thoughts About Multiple Damages, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 97, 
112 [hereinafter Thoughts About Multiple Damages] (calling actual damages “a misnomer 
of undeniable dimensions”); see also G. Robert Blakey et al., What’s Next?: The Future of 
RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1087 (1990) [hereinafter The Future of RICO] (refer-
ring to actual damages as “a fiction out of the 19th century”). 
 34. For an example of a case where many of the limitations on § 1983 actions con-
verge to deny plaintiffs recovery, see Gates, 2001 WL 1098070. 
 35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000). 
 36. See, e.g., Steven P. Ragland, Using the Master’s Tools: Fighting Persistent Police 
Misconduct with Civil RICO, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 139, 145 n.55 (2001) (quoting Professor 
Chemerinsky as remarking that the use of RICO in police misconduct actions is “a novel 
theory, and it could tremendously expand the scope of the liability the city could be fac-
ing”).  
 37. Id.; but see B. J. Palermo, RICO Viewed as Cop Suit Sidelight, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 
25, 2000, at A4 (noting that the attorney for plaintiffs in RICO actions against LAPD offi-
cers had conceded that the potential of “treble damages has been exaggerated” and also 
quoting the “architect of the RICO law,” Professor Blakey, as saying that a “false impres-
sion has been created that the police department is a defendant and [that the plaintiff] will 
score big time” in these claims against LAPD officers (alteration in original)). 
 38. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).  
 39. See id. 
 40. See Bandes, supra note 26, at 1305 (“One of the salient characteristics of police 
brutality is that it is largely practiced on poor and minority groups . . . .”). 
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be extensive for plaintiffs who, in many cases, were low-wage work-
ers or unemployed when they suffered their injuries.41  
 Additionally, it has been argued that RICO has the potential to 
fill what is presently a remedial vacuum for many misconduct vic-
tims.42 That is, where victims cannot rely on § 1983 or some other 
cause of action, they might still redress their injuries by availing 
themselves of RICO.43 This, too, however, is doubtful. Rather, RICO 
appears to suffer from many of the same procedural vulnerabilities 
as § 1983, making it an unlikely candidate to fill major gaps in civil 
rights law.  
 Yet none of this is to suggest that RICO has no place in efforts to 
combat police misconduct. Instead, RICO’s principal value may lie in 
its potential to make a powerful statement about the nature of police 
misconduct. Under RICO, plaintiffs would have to prove that police 
departments like the LAPD conduct activities that are normally as-
sociated with mobsters. This might in turn bear practical conse-
quences in the fight against police misconduct, not the least of which 
is conveying, particularly to the general public, that the LAPD is, in 
kind, no different than the mob. In other words, RICO could, at least 
symbolically, dispel the bad apple theory of police misconduct. Addi-
tionally, other potential advantages under RICO (relative to § 1983) 
include the prospect of broad discovery requests, a relaxed statute of 
limitations, and its avoidance of Heck v. Humphrey’s44 bar on collat-
eral suits. While these advantages would not wholly compensate for 
the inadequacies of § 1983, they would at least provide misconduct 
victims and their lawyers additional tools in an otherwise poorly-
stocked toolbox.45 Presently, though, the viability of RICO applied as 
such has been placed in serious doubt. 
 Even by the LAPD’s own account,46 proving the racketeering as-
pect of claims against Rampart officers would probably not, in most 
cases, be a high hurdle to overcome. In fact, the major obstacle for 
plaintiffs in these actions has, thus far, not been a problem in linking 
the LAPD to a pattern of racketeering activity. Rather, the difficulty 
has been in satisfying RICO’s injury to business or property require-
                                                                                                                    
 41. See generally id. (explaining that minorities and low-income earners are more of-
ten subjected to police brutality). 
 42. See Ragland, supra note 36, at 172-75. 
 43. See id. 
 44. 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (holding that a court will only proceed in a § 1983 action 
if its decision would not render another criminal judgment against the plaintiff invalid).   
 45. See Steven Ragland’s clever use of metaphor, in referring to RICO as a tool (the 
Master’s Tool) for police misconduct plaintiffs. See Ragland, supra note 36, at 139 n.1. 
 46. Despite perhaps underestimating the scope and nature of the Rampart Scandal, 
the LAPD’s Board of Inquiry Report, however inadequate, probably still contains enough 
findings of misconduct to support a pattern of racketeering. See Chemerinsky, supra note 
6, at 553-59. 
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ment.47 In Guerrero v. Gates, a federal judge ruled that the plaintiff’s 
allegations of “lost employment, employment opportunities, wages, 
and other compensation” constituted cognizable injuries under 
RICO.48 However, another judge in the same district recently held in 
Walker v. Gates that such injuries are not redressable under RICO, 
reasoning instead that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries were personal 
in nature rather than injuries to business or property as required by 
§ 1964(c).49 Thus, at least in the Central District of California, it is 
presently unclear whether a plaintiff in a police misconduct action 
has standing to allege a RICO violation when his only injuries are 
lost income or opportunities for income.  
 Under Ninth Circuit precedent, Walker appears to be the proper 
decision.50 However, in interpreting RICO according to its original 
purpose and relevant Supreme Court precedent, this Comment con-
tends that the Walker court’s construction of RICO’s injury to busi-
ness or property requirement is an insufficient basis for dismissing 
claims that are truer to RICO’s basic purpose—to give citizens a 
mechanism to fight back against enterprises who they might other-
wise be helpless in resisting51—than many of its more established 
applications. That is, the activity of the LAPD, unlike that of many 
other entities targeted under RICO, is precisely in the nature of what 
the original enactors of RICO sought to prevent.52  
 This Comment thus argues first that while RICO’s value in police 
misconduct actions may not be quite what some commentators ini-
tially predicted it is nonetheless worth fighting for.53 It then contends 
that the better view, in reconciling Guerrero and Walker, is one in 
which strained interpretations of the Act’s injury to business or prop-
erty requirement (a la Walker) do not preclude its use in police mis-
conduct actions—though, for now, it appears that the better resolu-
tion of Walker and Guerrero is probably not the most likely resolu-
tion. 
                                                                                                                    
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).   
 48. 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 49. No. CV 01-10904GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618, at *7-10 (C.D. Cal. May 28, 
2002) (unpublished order). 
 50. See Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992) (con-
cluding that personal injuries are not recoverable under RICO). 
 51. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 
922.   
 52. See id.   
 53. Near the end of the second movie in Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings trilogy, Sam re-
marks to Frodo that “[f]olk . . . had lots of chances of turning back only they didn’t. Because 
they were holding on to something.” Frodo then asks the obviously begged question, “What 
are we holding on to, Sam?” To which, Sam replies, “There’s some good in this world . . . . 
And it’s worth fighting for.” LORD OF THE RINGS: THE TWO TOWERS (New Line Cinema 
2002) (transcript), available at http://www.council-of-elrond.com/tttrans.html (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2003). In more than one respect, the above dialogue may be (or at least should be) 
a fitting encapsulation of the civil-rights lawyer’s credo. 
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 Part II of this Comment briefly chronicles the evolution of civil 
RICO in order to assess the appropriateness of its application in po-
lice misconduct actions. Part III evaluates traditional remedies for 
police misconduct. Part IV suggests possible reasons for using RICO 
in police misconduct actions relative to the shortcomings of tradi-
tional remedies. Part V discusses the requirements for pleading a 
RICO claim. Part VI assesses the viability of RICO in police miscon-
duct actions by evaluating the conflict between the Guerrero and 
Walker decisions. Finally, Part VII briefly concludes this Comment. 
II.   IT’S ALIVE!: THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL RICO AND WHETHER ITS 
APPLICATION TO THE LAPD IS A LOGICAL NEXT STEP 
Jimmy Hoffa was not above the law, and that is precisely the same 
thing with a Mike Milken . . . . [T]he King’s writ runs not only on 
Mulberry Street, but [also] on Wall Street.54 
 When President Richard Nixon signed RICO into law in 1970, he 
declared its use as a major tool in the war against organized crime.55 
This sentiment was shared by others instrumental in enacting RICO, 
whose principal concern was the destructive impact by groups like La 
Cosa Nostra on American economic life.56 While RICO was written to 
carefully avoid any specific reference to organized crime, it is 
unlikely that Congress or the President anticipated that RICO would 
be anywhere near as comprehensive in its application as it is today.57 
Certainly, few people, if any, expected that thirty years after RICO’s 
enactment, it would be used against the very people—law enforce-
ment officials—who are responsible for carrying out RICO’s original 
design: fighting gangsters and other criminal elements.58 Perhaps 
even more ironically, it is, in some cases, alleged criminals or gang-
sters who are utilizing RICO. While it may be somewhat counter-
intuitive, this latest stage in RICO jurisprudence (that is, its applica-
tion to police misconduct) is merely a logical next step in its evolu-
tion. 
                                                                                                                    
 54. The Future of RICO, supra note 33, at 1095 (quoting Professor Blakey). 
 55. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON 846-
47 (1970) [hereinafter NIXON’S REMARKS].  
 56. See S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76 (1969). 
 57. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994); H.J., Inc. v. 
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & 
Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); 
Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985). 
 58. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 
922.  
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A.   The Evolution of a Monster59 
 The Senate bill responsible for creating a private right of action 
under RICO was clear in its targets: La Cosa Nostra, the Mafia, the 
mob, gangsters, and the underworld.60 Nevertheless, Congress 
stopped short of making an explicit reference to organized crime in 
the text of RICO.61 The main concern of RICO’s drafters was that a 
clear reference to organized crime could raise the specter of constitu-
tional scrutiny—a specific mention of La Cosa Nostra, for instance, 
might be interpreted as either creating a status crime or, worse yet, 
as targeting a particular ethnic group.62 Erring on the side of caution 
(or so it was perceived), Congress then passed RICO to provide for 
the liability of any person violating its provisions.63 This most general 
of references has led to very literal interpretations by the courts, and 
consequently, an application of RICO that extends well beyond mem-
bers of organized crime.64  
 In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Justice White, in writing for the 
majority, remarked that civil RICO was “evolving into something 
quite different from the original conception of its enactors.”65 Despite 
this candid recognition, the Court held that RICO’s use outside the 
context of organized crime was inherent because RICO refers to “‘any 
person’—not just mobsters.”66 Sedima, then, essentially affirmed the 
trend in RICO litigation whereby, of the 270 known RICO cases de-
cided prior to that point, forty percent involved securities fraud, 
thirty-seven percent involved common law commercial fraud, and 
only nine percent actually involved suits against professional crimi-
nals.67 Despite the urgings of many to retreat to a narrower applica-
                                                                                                                    
 59. See Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and Approval of Federal RICO Prose-
cutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1037 (1990) (discussing a luncheon address about 
RICO given by Judge David B. Sentelle of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in which he referred to RICO as the “[m]onster [t]hat [a]te 
[j]urisprudence”). 
 60. See Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public Interest: Lessons from 
Civil RICO, 50 SMU L. REV. 33, 38-50 (1996). 
 61. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).  
 62. See G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster 
Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: “Mother of God—Is This the 
End of RICO?,” 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 860-67 (1990). 
 63. Id. 
 64. With RICO’s provision for threefold damages, few plaintiffs’ lawyers have hesi-
tated to capitalize on the Court’s implicit invitation to apply the Act outside the context of 
organized crime. See Abrams, supra note 60, at 52 (discussing RICO’s legislative history). 
Accordingly, one judge has asked: “‘Would any self-respecting plaintiffs’ lawyer omit a 
RICO charge these days?’” Id. (quoting Papagiannis v. Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177, 179 n.1 
(N.D. Ill. 1985)). 
 65. 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985). 
 66. Id. at 495. 
 67. Id. at 498 n.16. 
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tion,68 later cases followed the lead of Sedima in interpreting the 
scope of civil RICO very broadly.69  
B.   In the Monster’s Sights: The LAPD As a Logical Next Step in 
RICO’s Evolution? 
 As discussed later in this Comment, applying RICO to police mis-
conduct faces certain potentially fatal difficulties.70 These difficulties 
are not, however, traced to either the status of defendant officers or 
their departments. On the contrary, there is nothing in civil RICO 
jurisprudence that indicates its application should stop short of po-
lice officers. In fact, not only do cases against the police square with 
the low threshold set by Sedima and its progeny, but, additionally, 
the conduct of corrupt police forces appears to be more along the lines 
of what Congress intended to prohibit than many of RICO’s other 
applications outside of organized crime. 
 In Sedima, the Court found any person to be an unambiguous ref-
erence.71 As such, no one is per se excluded from RICO’s coverage. 
There does not, therefore, seem to be any justification for categori-
cally excluding police officers. In fact, liability for the type of blue-
collar, violent crime (for example, murder, attempted murder) en-
gaged in by police officers seems to be more consistent with RICO’s 
original design than many of its established applications.72 For in-
stance, much of the criticism aimed at the expansion of RICO has 
been focused on its use in redressing white-collar crime.73 Critics 
charge that RICO was never intended as a tool to harass innocent 
businessmen.74 While police departments, like white-collar entities, 
are legitimate enterprises, the form of racketeering that takes place 
through an entity like the LAPD appears to much more closely re-
semble the conduct of an archetypal mobster. The acts allegedly 
committed by Rampart officers—murder, attempted murder, rob-
                                                                                                                    
 68. See, e.g., Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Reforming Diversity Jurisdiction 
and Civil RICO, Address at the Eleventh Seminar on the Administration of Justice (April 
7, 1989), in 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 5, 11-13 (1989). While congressional action has been urged 
and sometimes explored, resulting legislation has done little to restrict RICO. See, e.g., 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat. 737, 
758 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77Z-1 to 77Z-3 (2000)). 
 69. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994); H.J., Inc. v. 
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Agency Holding Corp. of Chicago v. Mal-
ley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 
220 (1987); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985). 
 70. See infra Part V.  
 71. 473 U.S. at 495.  
 72. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §1, 84 Stat. 922.  
 73. See, e.g., Wounding the RICO Beast, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1989, at F2 (discuss-
ing how labor unions, corporations, and other non-mobsters have been adversely affected 
by RICO). 
 74. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 187 (1970). 
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bery, and narcotics dealing, to name a few—are precisely the types of 
offenses that RICO was intended to address.75 Moreover, both the 
frequency of crimes committed by the LAPD and the systematic way 
in which the crimes appear to have been carried out seem to clearly 
distinguish cases against its officers from cases brought against 
many white-collar offenders. So, not only do suits against police offi-
cers under RICO appear to square with the any person standard 
adopted by the Sedima Court, but the conduct of departments like 
the LAPD are in some ways representative of the very behavior that 
RICO was designed to address. For now, then, it is worth noting that 
applying RICO to police misconduct, particularly of the kind engaged 
in by Rampart officers, appears to be a logical next step in the evolu-
tion of civil RICO. 
III.   WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE TOOLBOX?: EVALUATING TRADITIONAL 
REMEDIES FOR POLICE MISCONDUCT 
 Much of the difficulty in remedying police misconduct stems from 
its disproportionate impact on socioeconomic and racial minorities. 
So long as police misconduct is a minority issue, the prospects of 
long-term political or institutional reform are meager. As a result, 
victims of police misconduct have instead relied heavily on the courts 
for redressing their injuries and for more systemic remedies. In re-
cent years, however, legal redress of this kind has been severely lim-
ited. It is presumably for this reason, at least in part, that victims 
have turned to RICO to compliment their existing modes of redress.  
A.   Political Redress 
 Theoretically, the most effective means of addressing police mis-
conduct is, perhaps, to hold elected officials accountable for the con-
duct of their police departments. If citizens are dissatisfied with the 
conduct of their police, they can demand that their representatives 
implement reforms or suffer the consequences on election day. This 
assumes, however, a favorable distribution of political power that, in 
reality, rarely exists.  
 Police misconduct is largely a problem that is borne by socioeco-
nomic and racial minorities, who lack the political and economic re-
sources to demand political change.76 Moreover, even assuming an ef-
fective coalition of racial and economic minorities, this does not nec-
essarily mean that police misconduct will be adequately addressed. It 
has been suggested that lower-income, racial minorities might actu-
ally be the least interested in protecting civil liberties when doing so 
                                                                                                                    
 75. See NIXON’S REMARKS, supra note 55, at 846 (noting RICO’s objective of combating 
“drug traffic in this country”). 
 76. See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1470. 
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potentially interferes with effective law enforcement.77 After all, they 
are the ones who must pay the price when sensitivity to civil liberties 
compromises effective law enforcement.78 So long as this is the pre-
vailing perception—that misconduct is not a minority problem but 
rather something that only criminals need to worry about—reform, 
at least insofar as it focuses on greater respect for civil liberties, has 
little chance for support even among minorities.79  
 Political majorities, on the other hand, are generally unlikely to 
identify with the interests of any minority group unless there is some 
corresponding self-interest at stake. The riots that followed the beat-
ing of Rodney King and the economic losses that resulted are a good 
illustration of how serious matters must become before a political 
majority takes an otherwise minority issue seriously. Although the 
Rampart Scandal was serious, it did not pose an economic threat to 
the political majority like the riots did and thus did not hold the 
same potential to effect reform. This is not to say that a conscientious 
majority will not sometimes act on the basis of purer motives. How-
ever, this depends on a number of variables that are too uncertain to 
provide consistent protection to real or potential misconduct victims. 
Moreover, even when high-profile events act on the more altruistic 
sensibilities of the politically relevant, their responses tend to be 
short-lived. That the LAPD remains one of the most corrupt police 
forces in the world ten years after Rodney King’s beating is a testa-
ment to the whimsical quality of majoritarian responses to minority 
issues. As long as police misconduct remains predominately a minor-
ity issue, then political action will fail to yield an adequately consis-
tent solution. 
                                                                                                                    
 77. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 115 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). As Justice Thomas stated: 
[T]he people who will suffer from [the majority’s] lofty pronouncements are 
people . . . who have seen their neighborhoods literally destroyed by gangs and 
violence and drugs. They are good, decent people who must struggle to over-
come their desperate situation, against all odds, in order to raise their families, 
earn a living, and remain good citizens. As one resident described: “There is 
only about maybe one or two percent of the people in the city causing these 
problems maybe, but it’s keeping 98 percent of us in our houses and off the 
streets and afraid to shop.” By focusing exclusively on the imagined “rights” of 
the two percent, the Court . . . has denied our most vulnerable citizens the very 
thing that . . . elevates above all else—the “‘freedom of movement.’” And that is 
a shame. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Here, I refer to minorities in the ordinary sense. However, criminals are another 
less-politically-relevant minority. See Dorf & Issacharoff, supra note 26, at 928. 
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B.   Federal Enforcement 
 Under 18 U.S.C. § 241, the federal government has authority to 
criminally prosecute anyone who, with at least one other individual, 
“conspire[s] to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person” in 
order to deprive that person of her constitutional rights.80 Likewise, 
§ 242 provides for the criminal prosecution of anyone who under color 
of law willfully deprives another of her constitutional rights.81  
 The effectiveness of these provisions is severely limited.82 First, in 
order to prove a violation of either provision, the government must 
establish not only that the defendant conspired to deprive or actually 
deprived someone of her constitutional rights, but additionally, it 
must prove that the defendant specifically intended to do so.83 Thus, 
even if the government can prove beyond question that an officer de-
prived an individual of her constitutional rights, there is absolutely 
no culpability that follows unless it can also be established that the 
harm was specifically intended.84 This has had the obvious effect of 
making civil rights violations extremely difficult to prove and almost 
certainly has led to a greater reluctance on the government’s part to 
prosecute cases in the first place. Second, regardless of the difficul-
ties involved in winning a § 241 or § 242 prosecution, everything ini-
tially depends on the government’s willingness to prosecute. Much, 
then, hinges on the administration’s commitment to civil rights, its 
willingness to interfere with local or state matters, and the funding 
made available to prosecute cases. Depending on the administration 
or other relevant political circumstances, these considerations will of-
ten weigh in favor of governmental restraint.  
 In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Enforce-
ment Act of 1993,85 which included 42 U.S.C. § 14141, a provision 
which empowers the Justice Department to “obtain appropriate equi-
table and declaratory relief” against a governmental authority en-
gaged in a pattern or practice that deprives persons of their constitu-
tional rights.86 The enactment of this provision is so recent that it is 
difficult to predict its potential impact in remedying police miscon-
                                                                                                                    
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000). 
 81. Id. § 242. 
 82. For further discussion of federal enforcement under §§ 241-42, see Hoffman, supra 
note 19, at 1488-91. 
 83. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 
91 (1945). 
 84. As always, proving intent is much more difficult than establishing what actually 
took place. Even when, in reality, intent was present, proving it to a jury is no simple feat. 
 85. One commentator has proposed that amending 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to include a pri-
vate right of action would allow for more consistent protection of civil rights against police 
misconduct. Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Pri-
vate Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 passim (2000). 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000). 
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duct. However, like 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, its effect will only be 
as extensive as the government’s zeal in enforcing it. Thus, it is 
unlikely that it will result in a consistent safeguarding of rights. 
C.   Private Right of Action: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
 Where other actions rely on political or administrative decision-
makers, § 1983 empowers the victims of police misconduct them-
selves to redress the harms committed by corrupt police departments 
and their officers.87 Despite its flaws, it has, therefore, been the most 
effective tool in redressing police misconduct.88  
 Section 1983 provides for liability of “[e]very person who, under 
color of . . . [state law] subjects . . . any citizen . . . to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion.”89 Persons under § 1983 may include state employees or munici-
palities.90 Thus, police officers, chiefs, departments, and even their 
policymaking superiors are theoretically subject to liability under § 
1983. Prudential limitations imposed by the courts91 have, however, 
severely restricted the actual scope of § 1983 and thereby rendered 
many victims without adequate means to compensate their injuries. 
Perhaps more importantly though, § 1983 has also been effectively 
disabled as a basis for fundamental reform of corrupt departments 
like the LAPD. Additionally, stringent statutes of limitations, jury 
tendencies, and other restrictions further decrease the chances of 
success on a § 1983 claim and diminish the likelihood that claims will 
ever be brought in the first place.92  
1.   Barriers to Municipal Liability and Qualified Immunity 
 While § 1983 technically allows for suits against municipalities, 
the threshold for liability is so high that entities like the LAPD enjoy 
something close to effective immunity. The principal limitation at is-
sue is a complete foreclosure on respondeat superior liability.93 Thus, 
a plaintiff cannot, as a matter of course, sue a police department on 
the basis of violations committed by its officers. Instead, under Mo-
nell v. Department of Social Services,94 a plaintiff must prove that the 
alleged constitutional deprivation was approved either through offi-
cial decisionmaking channels or implicitly through a governmental 
                                                                                                                    
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  
 88. Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1504. 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 90. See Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1504. 
 91. Id. at 1511.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1505.  
 94. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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custom.95 This latter standard appears to leave room for plaintiffs to 
sue when they suffer constitutional harm resulting from an officer’s 
lack of training or supervision, or otherwise stated, the department’s 
implicit approval of officer misconduct. Assuming that this was the 
end of the analysis, the potential for pressuring departments into 
providing adequate training and supervision would be tremendous. 
However, policymakers, in failing to address this issue, must be 
proven to have acted with deliberate indifference96 to the risk of “the 
particular injury suffered by the plaintiff[s].”97 In effect, then, it is 
very difficult to impose liability on municipalities for failure to proac-
tively prevent constitutional injuries. 
 Actions against individual police officers suffer from similar diffi-
culties. Here, an officer’s qualified immunity defense is the principal 
obstacle. To overcome the defense, a plaintiff must prove that the of-
ficer violated clearly established law in causing the plaintiff’s consti-
tutional injury.98 While in many instances the law violated will in-
deed have been clearly established, this does not necessarily trans-
late into a favorable verdict for the plaintiff. As Judge Newman 
stated before a subcommittee on civil and constitutional rights: 
To most jurors hearing a jury instruction on the defense of quali-
fied immunity, it simply sounds as if the officer should not be 
found liable if he thought he was behaving lawfully, and many ju-
rors will give him the benefit of the doubt on that issue, even if 
they think his conduct was improper.99 
Moreover, even when plaintiffs are successful in actions against indi-
vidual officers, it is worth noting that damages are almost invariably 
paid by the municipality.100 While this, on the one hand, relieves 
pressure on individual officers, the willingness of municipalities to 
indemnify their officers is seldom correlated with a desire to effec-
tively prevent violations from occurring again. Often, where an indi-
vidual bad apple is to blame, the politically expedient thing to do is to 
avoid controversy by settling claims without addressing the systemic 
nature of the problem.101 
2.   Barriers to Injunctive Relief: City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 
 In terms of effecting institutional reform, the critical limitation on 
§ 1983 actions is what, in many cases, functions essentially as a ban 
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 96. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). 
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on injunctive relief. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Supreme 
Court held that, unless a plaintiff can establish “a real and immedi-
ate threat” that the harm alleged will occur in the future, injunctive 
relief is not available.102 In Lyons, the plaintiff requested an injunc-
tion to stop the LAPD from using a particular chokehold in response 
to non-deadly force.103 While the plaintiff alleged that, without being 
provoked, the officers administered the chokehold on him until he 
passed out104 and that in a span of seven years this same chokehold 
caused the deaths of fifteen people,105 the Court held that the plaintiff 
was without standing to request that the LAPD be enjoined from us-
ing the chokehold in response to non-deadly force.106 Even if it were 
certain that the LAPD would again apply the chokehold to someone, 
the Court would not grant the injunction unless the plaintiff could 
establish that he would again be choked.107 Thus, in the words of Jus-
tice Marshall, even “if the police adopt . . . a policy of shooting 1 out 
of 10 suspects, the federal courts will be powerless to enjoin its con-
tinuation.”108 Plaintiffs, therefore, have essentially no means to pro-
actively ensure, under § 1983, that their constitutional rights will not 
be infringed by state actors. 
3.   Statute of Limitations 
 An additional obstacle in many § 1983 claims is its statute of limi-
tations. The Supreme Court has held that although federal law gov-
erns the characterization of a § 1983 claim for statute of limitations 
purposes, state law governs the length of the limitations period and 
its tolling and application.109 In some states, including California, 
plaintiffs only have one year from the time of their injury to initiate a 
cause of action.110 In addition to the obvious problem that the claims 
of many plaintiffs become time-barred and thus are never heard, a 
strict statute of limitations has the added effect of shortening the 
time period in which other plaintiffs can gather the necessary re-
sources to effectively litigate their claims. 
                                                                                                                    
 102. 461 U.S. 95, 110 (1983).  
 103. Id. at 98. 
 104. Id. at 97.  
 105. Id. at 100.  
 106. Id. at 105. 
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4.   Heck v. Humphrey 
 In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 claim which im-
plicitly challenges a plaintiff’s previous criminal conviction is barred 
until the conviction is “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by execu-
tive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make 
such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issu-
ance of a writ of habeas corpus.”111 This holding has obvious implica-
tions in police misconduct actions: barring success on some prior pre-
scribed action, victims of police misconduct are prevented from suing 
to redress their injuries. Thus, for instance, police misconduct vic-
tims who are framed or are convicted on the basis of a police officer’s 
false testimony could not sue under § 1983 until they first proved 
their innocence in a separate action.112 Accordingly, Heck has been 
the downfall of many § 1983 claims113 and has likely kept many more 
from ever being brought. 
5.   Jury Tendencies 
 Benefit of the doubt determinations by jurors are not restricted to 
the context of qualified immunity. Besides favoring police officers, ju-
rors are also responsive to the credibility issues posed by most police 
misconduct plaintiffs.114 Typically, plaintiffs in § 1983 actions are in-
dividuals who either were allegedly engaged in criminal activity at 
the time when their injuries occurred or at least have criminal back-
grounds.115 Even when jurors find in favor of plaintiffs, these consid-
erations bear on the amount of damages they award.116 Such tenden-
cies, coupled with other difficulties in proving § 1983 claims, result in 
yet another major problem—many legitimate claims are probably 
never litigated because they fail to survive the cost-benefit analysis 
that lawyers employ when determining whether to invest in a case.117 
 While § 1983 remains the best cause of action available in police 
misconduct actions, it is hardly a panacea for victims. Rather, it pro-
vides neither reliable redress for injuries nor a means to effectively 
address systemic misconduct. In cities like Los Angeles, where police 
misconduct is common and political attempts at reform have been 
largely unsuccessful, the ineffectiveness of § 1983 means that many 
                                                                                                                    
 111. 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). 
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citizens are left to live under a constant threat of abuse by corrupt 
departments and their officers. 
IV.   WHY RICO? 
This makes it possible that we can demonstrate what I have al-
ways claimed: The LAPD is a criminal enterprise.118 
 In what is, in many respects, presently a remedial vacuum for po-
lice misconduct victims, RICO may, to some degree, partially com-
pensate for the inadequacies of more traditional remedies like 
§ 1983. Perhaps more importantly, though, there are other potential 
advantages that inhere in applying civil RICO in police misconduct 
actions.  
A.   Damages 
 Discussion of RICO’s advantages typically begins with reference 
to its provision for treble damages.119 In police misconduct actions, 
specifically, the prospect of large recoveries has two possible advan-
tages. The most immediate advantage is obvious enough—a windfall 
for plaintiffs and their lawyers. The second possible advantage re-
lates to § 1983’s virtual prohibition on injunctive relief. Assuming 
treble damages would mean a massive increase in liability exposure, 
continued indemnification of officer misconduct without reduction in 
the frequency of offenses would soon spell financial ruin for munici-
palities.120 Under this scenario, municipalities would be faced with 
the choice of either reforming their police departments or enduring 
the political consequences of draining public coffers.121 If the mere 
threat of RICO induced cities to choose the former, its impact would 
be analogous to injunctive relief. All this, however, assumes that ac-
tual damages are significant enough that the RICO multiplier will 
result in extensive liability. If it were as simple as tripling § 1983 
damages, this would most assuredly be the result. This, however, is 
not exactly the equation under RICO. 
 Because, under RICO, only injuries to business or property are 
compensable, pain and suffering and other conventional compensa-
tory damages are not recoverable.122 Thus, under RICO, unlike 
                                                                                                                    
 118. Henry Weinstein, Judge OKs Use of Racketeering Law in Rampart Suits; LAPD 
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§ 1983, a plaintiff who suffers wrongful imprisonment would only be 
entitled to whatever injury to business or property was suffered as a 
result of her arrest.123 Even assuming for now that lost income or lost 
opportunity for income are compensable, the average RICO claim in 
a police misconduct action would probably stand to gain plaintiffs lit-
tle in the way of damages. Unless a plaintiff’s wages are exception-
ally high or a plaintiff’s low wages were deprived over a very long pe-
riod of time, the amount of lost income or lost opportunity for income 
would tend to be very little—if not from the plaintiff’s perspective, 
then at least from the perspective of his lawyer and the defendant. 
That the amount is tripled would be of some solace to the plaintiff 
and his lawyer but would still not constitute the huge recoveries 
imagined by some when RICO was first tested in the police miscon-
duct context.  
 Under RICO, any chance at substantial recoveries in police mis-
conduct suits would probably have to come by consolidating claims 
into class actions. Even coupled with attorney’s fees (also provided 
for under civil RICO),124 however, class actions would probably still 
not result in the crippling liability (and huge recoveries) that some 
observers initially anticipated. Much, of course, depends on the size 
of the class and how willing the courts will be to recognize class 
members’ injuries as cognizable under RICO. If classes are limited to 
individuals who are directly impacted by police misconduct (for ex-
ample, those who are kidnapped and murdered), then the classes will 
probably not be large enough to allow for large aggregate recover-
ies.125  
 On the other hand, if courts were willing to view, for instance, the 
lost business income that store owners and other business persons 
suffer due to police misconduct (for example, killing and falsely ar-
resting potential customers or clients), potential class sizes would be-
come much larger and so, too, would the potential for large recover-
ies. Depending on how remote the courts would allow an injury to be, 
one can imagine how virtually everyone within a city where police 
misconduct is pervasive might be impacted economically in small 
measure (for example, the extra cost that someone pays in gasoline to 
avoid an area where police officers facilitate narcotics dealing). As 
this Comment later discusses, however, proximate cause analysis 
clearly limits recoveries for indirect or remote injuries.126 Thus, bar-
ring exceptional facts, damages awards under RICO in police mis-
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conduct actions would tend to be relatively meager. The most that 
plaintiffs might hope for, then, is that treble damages under RICO, 
in concert with § 1983 damages, will compensate their injuries more 
adequately than actual damages ordinarily would.127 
B.   Pleading Requirements 
 Like § 1983, civil RICO does not depend on administrative or po-
litical discretion.128 It, therefore, provides an immediate advantage 
that other remedies, including the criminal provisions of RICO, do 
not have—that is, injured parties may commence claims on their own 
behalf.129 While, on its face, RICO does not appear to suffer from the 
same fatal pleading requirements that plague § 1983, its capacity to 
compensate for the weaknesses of § 1983 are mainly limited to its 
more relaxed statute of limitations. 
1.   Specific Intent 
 While RICO itself does not contain an intent element, many of 
RICO’s predicate offenses do. So, for instance, assuming again that 
deprivation of income constitutes an injury to business or property 
under RICO, a plaintiff, who is kidnapped by a police officer, would 
not have to prove that the officer intended to violate RICO, yet he 
would have to prove that the officer intended to kidnap him. It is 
unlikely, then, that RICO would compensate for the pleading difficul-
ties posed, for instance, by a qualified immunity defense in a § 1983 
claim.130 
 If the law violated is not clearly established and the qualified im-
munity defense is available in a § 1983 action, it is unlikely that the 
violation would be a predicate offense under RICO. For example, a 
police officer who arrests someone for using profanity may not have 
violated clearly established law in doing so, but the arrest would 
probably not constitute a predicate offense under RICO either. If the 
officer was considered to have acted in good faith and is thus immune 
from § 1983 liability, it is difficult to see how his act would then sat-
isfy the intent element of a RICO predicate offense. Thus, while the 
qualified immunity defense does not apply to RICO, this fact proba-
bly does little to compensate for the difficulties in overcoming the de-
fense in a § 1983 claim.  
 If there is any advantage to not facing a qualified immunity de-
fense in a RICO action, it is perhaps taking away an excuse for juries 
to absolve officers of liability. Even when clearly established law has 
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been violated, juries nevertheless will sometimes rely on the quali-
fied immunity defense to find in favor of defendant officers. The ab-
sence of this defense in the RICO context might leave juries without 
such a convenient excuse. However, a jury convinced that an officer 
was simply doing the best he could do under the circumstances, re-
gardless of legal or factual determinations, may find for that officer 
whether or not it has an immunity defense upon which to rely.131  
2.   Statute of Limitations 
 The clearest advantage to a RICO claim in a police misconduct ac-
tion is its uniformly relaxed statute of limitations. While § 1983 stat-
utes of limitations sometimes expire within as little as one year from 
the time of the plaintiff’s injury, a four-year statute of limitations 
applies to all civil RICO claims.132 This allows plaintiffs a much bet-
ter chance both to plead their claims as well as to muster the neces-
sary resources to do so effectively. 
3.   Heck v. Humphrey 
 There is presently a split among district courts in the Ninth Cir-
cuit over whether Heck applies to RICO suits. In Garcia v. Scribner, 
the court held, without analysis, that Heck applies to RICO suits in 
the same manner as it applies to § 1983 suits.133 However, in Hunter 
v. Gates, another case out of the Central District of California, the 
court refused to follow Garcia and held that RICO was not governed 
by Heck.134 Thus, at least in the district where Guerrero135 and 
Walker136 were decided, Heck does not necessarily prevent a RICO 
plaintiff from collaterally attacking a previous criminal conviction.  
C.   Discovery 
 To prove a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO, at least 
two predicate offenses over a ten-year period must have been com-
mitted in maintaining or conducting (or conspiring to maintain or 
conduct) the affairs of an enterprise.137 This provides a built-in justi-
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fication for plaintiffs’ lawyers to make broad discovery requests.138 
Apart from its obvious value in proving misconduct, information that 
would come through discovery spanning a ten-year period139 might 
significantly enhance the leverage of plaintiffs in settlement negotia-
tions.140 The information that could be generated through such a 
broad discovery request would not only bear on the defendant’s 
chances at trial but might also produce information that would lead 
to additional litigation. Once information becomes a part of the pub-
lic record, the police department and its officers would expose them-
selves to suits both by other injured parties as well as the govern-
ment. As cities attempt to avoid these risks, plaintiffs might begin to 
see increases in the frequency and size of their settlement awards.141 
D.   Exposing the LAPD for What It Is 
 The most important advantage of using civil RICO in police mis-
conduct actions may be its potential to dispel the bad apple theory of 
police misconduct. To prove a RICO violation, it must be shown that 
the defendant conducted (or conspired to conduct) an enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering activity.142 This means overcoming 
the perception that an officer bears all the responsibility for his mis-
conduct, independent of a larger, systemic pattern. While judgments 
would, technically, be rendered against individual police officers, the 
message of a favorable RICO verdict would also be an indictment of 
the departments that were used to facilitate their criminal conduct. 
It would, in effect, be a recognition of systemic police misconduct.  
 Additionally, by associating entities like the LAPD with a statute 
that was originally intended for groups like La Cosa Nostra, a jury 
might even convey the more ambitious message that the LAPD is, in 
kind, no different than an organized crime unit. As one civil rights 
attorney has said, “The most important thing is exposing the LAPD 
for what it is, . . . the mob.”143  
 Negative characterizations of a police department should not nec-
essarily be seen, however, as limited to mere abstract or moral victo-
ries. It is possible that exposing the LAPD for what it is would mean 
greater success in pleading other claims. For example, juries hearing 
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evidence on a pattern of illegal behavior might be less likely to carry 
favorable biases for police officers into deliberations on § 1983 claims. 
Additionally, a public that believes its police department is using its 
tax dollars to function as an organized crime unit might also be more 
inclined to press for more federal prosecutions. This would, in turn, 
create a greater comfort level on the part of the government to in-
trude on what is, otherwise, often considered a local matter. Like-
wise, placing the LAPD on par with the mob might be further incen-
tive for political officials to undertake serious efforts to reform the 
department. 
E.   Conclusion: The Potential Significance of RICO for Victims of 
Police Misconduct 
 RICO is by no means a substitute for § 1983. In fact, with the ex-
ception of its more relaxed statute of limitations and its presumed 
avoidance of Heck, it does very little to compensate for the deficien-
cies of § 1983. This does not mean, however, that the RICO experi-
ment is not worth seeing through. It is important to keep in mind 
that § 1983 and RICO are not mutually exclusive. The trend so far 
has been to plead RICO as a compliment to, not as a substitute for, 
§ 1983 claims.144 Assuming the viability of RICO liability in police 
misconduct actions, this trend will probably continue.145  
 RICO may not be the answer for police misconduct victims, but in 
the imperfect world of civil rights litigation, even the slightest ad-
vantages are worth sustaining. RICO’s potential as a discovery tool 
and the opportunities that it would provide to make a bold statement 
about the nature of police misconduct do not directly respond to the 
deficiencies of § 1983. Nevertheless, these advantages alone are 
enough to justify using RICO as a compliment to § 1983. The practi-
cal consequences that this would bear is anyone’s guess. However, it 
is at least conceivable that exposing a department like the LAPD for 
what it really is will have some influence on a legal culture that 
presently neglects the rights of police misconduct victims. 
V.   ELEMENTS OF A RICO CLAIM 
RICO is for me (and many, if not most, of my . . . colleagues) an 
agonizingly difficult and confusing area of the law.146 
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 RICO’s civil action provision, § 1964(c), states that “[a]ny person 
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 
1962 . . . may sue . . . and shall recover threefold the damages he sus-
tains.”147 Violations under § 1962 include investing income derived 
from a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise, acquiring or 
maintaining an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racket-
eering activity, conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity, or conspiring to do any of these through 
a pattern of racketeering activity.148 Thus, to establish standing un-
der § 1964(c), a plaintiff must plead the following elements: (1) the 
existence of an enterprise; (2) a predicate violation of § 1962; (3) a 
pattern of racketeering activity; and (4) an injury to his business or 
property.149 This Part discusses these elements in greater depth, fo-
cusing particularly on the critical inquiry posed to the Guerrero and 
Walker courts regarding RICO’s injury to business or property re-
quirement. 
A.   Enterprise: Who or What Is a RICO Enterprise? 
 An enterprise under RICO is defined broadly to include “any indi-
vidual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, 
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not 
a legal entity.”150 As discussed in Part II, RICO’s avoidance of any 
specific reference to organized crime has resulted in application to 
virtually every type of enterprise, illegitimate as well as legitimate. 
In particular, a majority of circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, have 
held that government entities (for example, police departments) sat-
isfy the enterprise requirement under RICO.151 There are, however, 
additional criteria for pleading this element. 
1.   Distinctness of Enterprise 
 While virtually any entity may constitute an enterprise under 
RICO, a limitation imposed by some courts, including the Ninth Cir-
cuit, requires that the defendant and the enterprise be distinct.152 
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Thus, the LAPD, for instance, could not serve as both the enterprise 
and the defendant in a RICO suit. Rather, as in both Walker and 
Guerrero, the defendants are individual officers, not the LAPD—the 
latter is instead the enterprise that the officers allegedly used to fa-
cilitate their misconduct.153  
2.   Affecting Interstate Commerce 
 Additionally, under § 1962(a), RICO only applies to enterprises 
“which [are] engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or 
foreign commerce.”154 For the Rampart Division, the relevant inquiry 
is whether it is an enterprise that affects interstate commerce. 
Clearly, at least in some small measure, a police department (or divi-
sion) affects interstate commerce. If nothing else, its ability to police 
affects matters like tourism or the growth of businesses within its ju-
risdiction, both of which have an impact on interstate commerce. Af-
ter the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, however, 
proving that an enterprise has some impact on interstate commerce 
may not be enough to end the analysis.155  
 In holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) unconstitu-
tional, the Supreme Court in Lopez determined that only economic 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are subject to 
legitimate regulation by Congress under the Commerce Clause.156 
While it is clear that, after Lopez, statutes like RICO will be judged 
by a stricter standard of scrutiny: just how much and whether RICO 
will withstand constitutional analysis is not entirely clear. In one 
breath, the Lopez Court recognized that, although a single activity 
trivial by itself may not substantially affect interstate commerce, 
that alone is not ‘“enough to remove [it] from the scope of federal 
regulation where, . . . taken together with that of many others . . . is 
far from trivial.’”157 The Court also noted, however, that “[w]hen Con-
gress criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the 
States, it effects a ‘change in the sensitive relation between federal 
and state criminal jurisdiction.’”158 It is no secret, of course, that al-
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tering this sensitive balance is something to which the present Court 
has been particularly hostile.159  
 In striking the GFSZA, the Court determined that: “The posses-
sion of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity 
that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any 
sort of interstate commerce.”160 Whether we take from this analysis 
that the GFSZA failed primarily because the possession of a gun is 
not an economic activity or because it did not substantially affect in-
terstate commerce, it is easy to imagine that, under this strict analy-
sis, many statutes, previously considered legitimate, will soon face 
serious constitutional challenges under Lopez.161  
 In gauging the implications of Lopez for RICO, one question that 
emerges is what precisely must affect commerce? Is it the enterprise, 
the racketeering activity that is facilitated through the enterprise, or 
the predicate offense responsible for the plaintiff’s injury? By way of 
analogy to Lopez, it appears that the relevant nexus to interstate 
commerce under RICO is probably the activity regulated, rather than 
the enterprise. Assuming this, it is questionable whether some RICO 
violations, particularly those that have traditionally been matters of 
state concern (for example, murder and kidnapping), can be legiti-
mately regulated under the Commerce Clause. 
 Thus far, the Supreme Court has managed to avoid the implica-
tions of Lopez for RICO, leaving the lower courts to sort through its 
many mysteries. There is very little indication, however, that lower 
courts are willing to apply Lopez in any way which would fundamen-
tally affect RICO.162 In United States v. Juvenile Male, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that “unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, ‘which was 
aimed at purely local, noneconomic activities,’” RICO is instead ‘“con-
cerned solely with inter state, rather than intra state, activities,’” 
and therefore is not subject to ‘“Lopez’s “substantially affects” 
test.’”163 Rather, the court stated, ‘“[w]here [a] crime . . . directly af-
fects interstate commerce,’” a plaintiff, to establish federal jurisdic-
tion, need “only to prove that the crime had a ‘de minimis effect’ on 
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interstate commerce.”164 Citing to Lopez, the court reasoned that be-
cause “RICO . . . regulates activities which, in the aggregate, have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce[,] . . . the ‘de minimis char-
acter of individual instances arising under [the] statute is of no con-
sequence.’”165 
 Juvenile Male would appear to allow for a finding that, while the 
misconduct of one department’s officers might not substantially af-
fect interstate commerce, police misconduct in the aggregate cer-
tainly does; therefore, the police-department activity is legitimately 
regulated under RICO. In many ways, however, regulating police 
misconduct resembles the GFSZA. For instance, a police department, 
like a school, is a local entity. And many acts of police misconduct 
(for example, murder, kidnapping, and attempted murder) are like 
gun possession, essentially noneconomic activities.166 Regardless, 
then, of how much a local entity like the LAPD affects interstate 
commerce through its noneconomic activities, it seems very likely 
that, if police misconduct actions brought under RICO do not falter 
on other grounds, they will soon be attacked under Lopez.  
3.   The Relationship of the Enterprise to the Prohibited Activities 
 While the enterprise itself is not actually sued,167 RICO plaintiffs 
must establish that the enterprise facilitated the defendant’s racket-
eering activity and that the enterprise felt the effects of the racket-
eering activity.168 So in cases like Guerrero and Walker, for example, 
plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the defendant officers’ acts 
were facilitated by their positions within the LAPD and that their 
racketeering activity impacted the operation of the LAPD.169  
 If plaintiffs’ claims are true, the racketeering activity of defendant 
officers appears to have been facilitated by their positions in the 
LAPD. After all, an ordinary citizen could not have planted narcotics, 
arrested, and wrongfully detained plaintiffs. Rather, defendants 
could have only done so in their capacities as officers of the LAPD. 
Additionally, it is equally difficult to imagine that the defendants’ ac-
tions would not have had an impact on the LAPD’s operation. Assum-
ing the best of all possible scenarios, the defendants’ conduct would 
have at least impacted the morale of other officers, the reputation of 
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the department, and hence the department’s ability to perform its es-
sential functions. Accordingly, pleading RICO’s enterprise element 
has not been the principal difficulty for police misconduct plaintiffs.  
B.   Predicate Offense 
 To be liable under RICO, a defendant must have committed any 
one of a number of predicate offenses listed in § 1961.170 Examples of 
predicate offenses include murder, robbery, kidnapping, bribery, ex-
tortion, mail and wire fraud, and Hobbs Act extortion violations.171 In 
Slade v. Gates, another case alleging violations of RICO by Rampart 
officers, the court held that assault, false arrest, and evidence plant-
ing were not predicate offenses under RICO because they were not 
specifically delineated in § 1961(1).172 This restriction has the effect of 
barring redress under RICO for many of the most common instances 
of police misconduct.173  
 Assuming that lost income or opportunity for income is com-
pensable under RICO (which the Slade court did not),174 the exclusion 
of false arrest, is particularly problematic. While the court in Slade 
found the plaintiff’s allegations of attempted murder, extortion, and 
drug dealing satisfactory,175 these offenses do not provide for a clear 
causal link to lost employment. For instance, an officer who attempts 
to murder someone in the process of carrying out a false arrest com-
mits a RICO predicate offense. This, however, is immaterial so long 
as it is the false arrest, rather than the attempted murder, that 
causes the victim’s lost employment. In order to establish liability, a 
plaintiff must instead allege a predicate offense that has a clear 
causal relationship to his injury. While certain predicate offenses (for 
example, witness tampering) might occasionally suffice, in the many 
instances where false arrest is the sole cause of an individual’s lost 
employment, victims would be without recourse under RICO. 
1.   Pleading a Factual Basis for Claims 
 While “RICO predicate acts need not be pled with particularity,” 
they “must be sufficiently pled to give [d]efendants notice of the fac-
tual basis of the claim.”176 The court in Slade found that the plaintiff 
failed “to allege any facts to support [his] claim[s] of extortion, at-
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tempted murder or drug dealing.”177 Conclusory allegations, the court 
held, are not enough to sufficiently plead a predicate act under 
RICO.178 Plaintiffs in RICO actions must be careful, then, not only to 
plead predicate acts that are specifically listed in § 1961, but also to 
support them with a factual basis.179  
2.   Predicate Offense Requirement for Conspiracies? 
 It is worth briefly mentioning that, prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Beck v. Prupis,180 a split existed among circuits over 
whether a plaintiff, who is ‘“injured . . . by reason of’ a ‘conspir[acy] to 
violate’” RICO, has to prove that her injury was caused by an enu-
merated RICO predicate offense.181 Beck resolved this conflict by 
holding that, in order to sufficiently plead a RICO conspiracy, a 
plaintiff must indeed allege that her injuries were the result of a spe-
cifically enumerated RICO predicate offense.182  
C.   Pattern of Racketeering Activity 
 To be liable under RICO, a defendant must infiltrate an enter-
prise or conspire to do so through “a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity.”183 A pattern of activity under RICO is defined as “at least two 
acts” (the same acts that satisfy the predicate offense element) “oc-
curr[ing] within [a span of] ten years.”184 “[T]wo isolated acts of rack-
eteering activity,” however, “do not constitute a pattern.”185 Rather, 
“[t]he infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than 
one ‘racketeering activity’ and the threat of continuing activity to be 
effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which com-
bines to produce a pattern.”186 
1.   Relationship Between Acts 
 A RICO pattern must be held together by some “common scheme, 
plan, or motive” so as not to merely constitute ‘“a series of discon-
nected acts.’”187 So, for instance, if a police officer in one division of 
the LAPD steals narcotics out of an evidence room and nine years 
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later an officer in another division bribes a witness to give false tes-
timony, these offenses, absent other facts, almost certainly would not 
constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO. Likewise, 
repetitive acts perpetrated against a single individual also would not 
constitute a pattern under RICO. Thus, if an officer robs an individ-
ual and then murders that same individual, these two acts would fail 
to satisfy RICO’s pattern requirement.188  
 It appears, however, that the alleged misconduct of the Rampart 
Division satisfies the relatedness prong of RICO’s pattern require-
ment. In a span of ten years, the Rampart Division is alleged to have 
committed hundreds of criminal acts, including murder, attempted 
murder, and robbery,189 all of which are acts listed in § 1961(1).190 
Putting aside more cynical theories for a moment, the common mo-
tive or scheme shared by officers committing these acts might have 
at least been the suppression of Los Angeles’ criminal element, albeit 
through the systematic deprivation of civil liberties. Less noble mo-
tives would, of course, include pecuniary gain or racism. In any case, 
with such a pervasive pattern of misconduct present, it is hard to 
imagine that plaintiffs could not piece together some common motive 
or scheme that directed the criminal activities of Rampart officers.  
2.   Continuity 
 To establish the continuity prong of RICO’s pattern requirement, 
a plaintiff must prove that the pattern of racketeering is part of an 
ongoing scheme that “poses a risk of continuing illegal activity.”191 
While it might be difficult, generally, to establish bright lines sepa-
rating mere sporadic activity192 versus that which poses a threat of 
continuing activity,193 cases against Rampart officers do not appear to 
present any such difficulties. As already noted, the Rampart division 
may have engaged in hundreds of illegal acts over the last ten 
years.194 There is little to suggest, moreover, that this behavior will 
cease anytime soon.195 If ever there were a threat of continuing illegal 
activity to be discovered, it would most likely be found in a corrupt 
division within a department like the LAPD.196  
                                                                                                                    
 188. Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 646 F. Supp. 118, 120 (D. Del 
1986). 
 189. LAPD Blues, supra note 13. 
 190. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000).  
 191. Medallion Television Enters. v. SelecTV of Cal., 833 F.2d 1360, 1363 n.2 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
 192. Id. at 1362.  
 193. Id. at 1363.  
 194. LAPD Blues, supra note 13. 
 195. See supra Part I. 
 196. See supra Parts I, III. 
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D.   Cognizable Injury 
 So far, the major obstacle to police misconduct victims bringing 
suit under RICO has been satisfying its injury to business or property 
requirement under § 1964(c).197 The courts have held that this limita-
tion at least precludes recovery for injuries that are purely personal 
in nature198 and that are not proximately caused by a RICO predicate 
offense.199 Beyond this, however, it is unclear what exactly consti-
tutes a cognizable injury under RICO. This lack of clarity was made 
especially apparent by conflicting decisions in Guerrero200 and 
Walker,201 both of which were cases brought by victims of Rampart 
misconduct. 
 In Guerrero, the court held that loss of income and lost opportu-
nity for income are cognizable injuries under RICO.202 Yet, less than 
two years later, the same district found in Walker that such injuries 
are personal in nature and, therefore, are non-compensable.203 This 
Section discusses the established requirements of pleading an injury 
under RICO as well as the split in authority that led to divergent 
conclusions of law in Walker and Guerrero.  
1.   Proximate Causation 
 As set forth in Sedima, a plaintiff must, at minimum, suffer an in-
jury by reason of racketeering activity in order to establish standing 
under RICO.204 Additionally, after Holmes v. Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corp., plaintiffs also have to prove that their injuries are di-
rectly caused by an act prohibited under RICO.205 The Court in 
Holmes was careful to note, however, that: 
“[T]he infinite variety of claims that may arise make it virtually 
impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the re-
sult in every case.” Thus, our use of the term “direct” should 
                                                                                                                    
 197. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).  
 198. See, e.g., Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992); 
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 201. Walker v. Gates, No. CV 01-1094GAF(PJWX), 2002 WL 1065618 (C.D. Cal. May 
28, 2002) (unpublished order). 
 202. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.  
 203. Walker, 2002 WL 1065618, at *7.  
 204. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495-97 (1985). 
 205. 503 U.S. 285, 272 (1992).  
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merely be understood as a reference to the proximate-cause en-
quiry [sic] that is informed by [policy] concerns . . . .206 
 To sort through whether an injury is sufficiently direct, courts 
have adopted a three-factor test, which considers the following fac-
tors:  
(1) whether there are more direct victims of the alleged wrongful 
conduct who can be counted on to vindicate the law as private at-
torneys general; (2) whether it will be difficult to ascertain the 
amount of the plaintiff’s damages attributable to defendant’s 
wrongful conduct; and (3) whether the courts will have to adopt 
complicated rules apportioning damages to obviate the risk of mul-
tiple recoveries.207 
Consistent with common law proximate-cause analysis, this test 
simply attempts to balance competing policy concerns.208 The first 
factor concerns the goal of enforcing RICO’s substantive provisions 
through private suits. This is then balanced with the last two factors, 
which are concerned with the administrative aspects of apportioning 
damages under RICO.  
 Generally, an injury that is the result of “harm flowing merely 
from the misfortunes visited upon a third person” will not confer 
standing under RICO.209 So, for instance, a store owner who is in-
jured in his business because a police officer murdered one of his cus-
tomers seemingly would not have standing because his injury flows 
from the misfortune of his deceased customer. But, what if, as this 
Comment later discusses, the deceased customer cannot bring suit 
because his injury is not cognizable under RICO?210 The first factor 
under the courts’ balancing test appears to suggest that the store 
owner might have standing on grounds that the deceased customer 
cannot vindicate RICO. This reasoning, however, has been handily 
rejected by the Ninth Circuit so long as the directly injured parties 
have some other means of vindicating the law.211 For example, then, 
a court would likely reject the store owner’s claim on grounds that 
                                                                                                                    
 206. Id. at n.20 (citations omitted) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. 
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983) in part). 
 207. Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. (Ore-
gon Laborers), 185 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 1999) (basing its test on the standard set forth 
in Holmes). 
 208. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 274. 
 209. Id. at 268-69. 
 210. See infra Part V.D.2. 
 211. Oregon Laborers, 185 F.3d at 964 (rejecting plaintiff’s assertion that third parties 
could bring claim on behalf of directly injured parties when the latter could not vindicate 
themselves under RICO but had other claims available to them). 
264  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:231 
 
the decedent’s family could sue under § 1983.212 Administrative diffi-
culties, moreover, would probably keep most courts from hearing 
claims based on such remote injuries (for example, calculating the 
store owner’s injury). It is likely, then, that if victims of police mis-
conduct cannot directly address their injuries under RICO, proxi-
mate cause will likewise prevent anyone else from doing so. As Jus-
tice Scalia remarked in Holmes: “Life is too short to pursue every 
human act to its most remote consequences; ‘for want of a nail, a 
kingdom was lost’ is a commentary on fate, not the statement of a 
major cause of action against a blacksmith.”213 
2.   Personal Injury Exclusion 
 Under RICO, a plaintiff may recover damages for injuries to busi-
ness or property.214 This phrase has been found to have restrictive 
significance,215 namely in barring recoveries for personal injuries.216 
Clearly, then, the emotional distress that results from a RICO predi-
cate offense would, for instance, not be compensable. Beyond this, 
however, it is not completely clear what constitutes a cognizable in-
jury under RICO. The principal conflict among circuit courts is be-
tween the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Oscar v. University Students 
Co-operative Association217 and that of the Fifth Circuit in Khurana 
v. Innovative Health Care Systems, Inc.218 In addition to Khurana, 
there are also several district court decisions that conflict with 
Oscar.219  
(a)   Oscar v. University Students Cooperative Association 
 In Oscar, the Ninth Circuit held that an injury under RICO “re-
quires proof of concrete financial loss, and not mere ‘injury to a valu-
able intangible property interest.’”220 Thus, the plaintiff in Oscar did 
                                                                                                                    
 212. If, however, § 1983 were not available for one of the reasons discussed earlier in 
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under Oregon Laborers. 
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not have standing to sue under RICO because her alleged injury, di-
minished use and enjoyment221 of her apartment, did not constitute a 
concrete financial loss.222 According to the court, where a plaintiff’s 
complaint is based on nothing more than personal discomfort and 
annoyance, it is essentially a non-compensable personal injury, re-
gardless of how the alleged injury might relate to the use of a valu-
able property interest.223 The court reasoned that, even if the plain-
tiff’s house had burned down, her injury would still not be com-
pensable so long as her financial loss was covered by insurance.224 
The severity of an injury is thus irrelevant to confer standing under 
RICO unless a plaintiff can claim a concrete financial loss. 
 Finally, the Oscar court also set forth the curious proposition that, 
while ‘“the economic aspects of [a fundamentally personal injury], 
could as a theoretical matter, be viewed as injuries to “business or 
property,” . . . engaging in such metaphysical speculation is a task 
best left to philosophers, not the federal judiciary.’”225 Thus, it ap-
pears that Oscar also stands for a blanket prohibition on any dam-
ages that flow from personal injuries, even if a plaintiff can show 
that her injuries resulted in concrete financial losses. 
(b)   Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Systems, Inc. 
 The Fifth Circuit is presently the only circuit whose interpretation 
of RICO’s injury to business or property requirement has clearly con-
flicted with Oscar.226 In Khurana, the Fifth Circuit held that both 
damage to professional reputation and lost business opportunities (in 
the form of lost employment opportunities) were cognizable injuries 
under RICO.227 The court in Khurana came to this conclusion without 
analysis of whether either falls within the definition of business or 
property.228 It appears, though, that the court considered both the 
plaintiff’s lost employment opportunities and the damage to his pro-
fessional reputation as injuries to business interests and, on that ba-
                                                                                                                    
 221. Id. at 787.  
 222. Id. at 785. 
 223. Id. at 787. 
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sis, held that he had requisite standing under RICO.229 It is not clear 
whether the court would have also held that any concrete financial 
loss flowing from the plaintiff’s injuries, even if purely personal in 
nature, would have been sufficient—this presumably was not a de-
termination that the Khurana court was obliged to make. 
(c)   District Court Decisions in Conflict with Oscar 
 In holding that lost opportunity for income and lost income are 
cognizable injuries under RICO, Guerrero relied not only on Khurana 
but also on a handful of lower court decisions from other circuits.230 
In the latest such case, National Asbestos Workers Medical Fund v. 
Philip Morris, Inc.,231 the court was faced with the question of 
whether pecuniary losses associated with personal injuries were cog-
nizable under RICO. In finding that they were, the court determined 
that: “[T]he exclusion of an entire class of pecuniary losses . . . would 
contravene the comprehensive Congressional scheme [behind RICO], 
contradict [its] most natural reading[,] . . . and result in underen-
forcement [sic] of [its] policies.”232 In explicitly refusing to follow 
Oscar and other like-minded decisions, the court contended that such 
decisions “are reminiscent of earlier attempts to engraft artificial 
limitations upon the standing provisions of RICO.”233 The court rea-
soned that RICO should instead be read consistently with its “plain 
language and legislative history call[ing] for a freer and more expan-
sive interpretation.”234 
VI.   PUTTING WALKER AND GUERRERO INTO PERSPECTIVE:  
INTERPRETING RICO’S INJURY TO “BUSINESS OR  
PROPERTY” REQUIREMENT 
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all 
Men, . . . every Man has a Property in his own Person . . . . The La-
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bour of his Body and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are prop-
erly his.235 
 There are two basic points of agreement between the Guerrero 
and Walker courts—both recognize that neither personal injuries nor 
intangible losses are recoverable under RICO. Their disagreement 
instead exists in determining whether lost employment—or, alterna-
tively, tangible losses flowing from personal injuries constitute cogni-
zable injuries under RICO. This Part explores this conflict in light of 
relevant precedent and suggests a resolution that comports with 
Congress’s objectives in enacting civil RICO.  
A.   Putting Guerrero and Walker into Perspective 
 Less than two years after Guerrero held that lost income or lost 
opportunity for income constituted an injury under RICO,236 a judge 
in the same district came to precisely the opposite conclusion in 
Walker.237 The split between these two courts hinged on a most fun-
damental question: What is property (under RICO)? 
1.   Guerrero 
 In Guerrero, the court, in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, 
held that the plaintiff’s alleged injury in the form of lost employment 
was cognizable under RICO.238 The basis for its decision, though, was 
not entirely clear. On the one hand, the court, relying on Khurana, 
noted that “[l]oss of employment [and] business opportunities . . . 
have . . . been held to constitute cognizable injuries . . . for purposes 
of RICO.”239 This suggests that the key determination is whether 
plaintiff’s underlying injury (for example, lost employment) is one to 
business or property.  
 However, in rejecting defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s injury 
was “nothing more than pecuniary losses stemming from personal in-
juries,”240 the court also noted what it perceived was a trend among 
the courts that “favor[s] . . . allowing RICO claims for the pecuniary 
losses associated with personal injuries caused by racketeering.”241 
Thus, the critical question left unanswered by Guerrero was whether 
the plaintiff’s financial loss was independently significant as an in-
jury to business or property or whether the loss was compensable 
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only because it flowed from an underlying injury (for example, lost 
employment) that is itself cognizable under RICO. 
 Under the first possibility, the derivation of the loss is immate-
rial.242 If it derived from a personal injury, this alone would not ex-
clude its compensability. If, for instance, plaintiff’s alleged injury was 
an expenditure for treatment of a psychological injury, the fact that 
the underlying injury was personal would be of no consequence—the 
money he spent on treatment could still be recovered. Under this 
analysis, determining whether lost employment is a personal injury 
or instead an injury to business or property has no bearing so long as 
concrete financial loss can be claimed. 
 On the other hand, the alternative interpretation of Guerrero 
would allow for recovery of tangible financial loss only if it derived 
from an injury to business or property. For instance, if plaintiff’s 
house was burned down, the threshold inquiry would be whether los-
ing his house was an injury to business or property. Only after an-
swering this question in the affirmative would the financial conse-
quences of his injury become relevant. On the other hand, a purely 
personal injury like psychological harm would not be compensable no 
matter how extensive its financial consequences. 
2.   Walker 
 Less than two years after Guerrero was decided, the court in 
Walker squarely rejected its reasoning.243 First, the Walker court held 
that ‘“economic losses which derive . . . from a fundamentally per-
sonal injury’ are not compensable under RICO.”244 In relying primar-
ily on cases cited to in Oscar,245 the court specifically precluded re-
covery for lost wages and employment that resulted from plaintiff’s 
false arrest because these, the court held, are fundamentally per-
sonal injuries.246 The court reasoned that just because the plaintiff 
suffered  “secondary financial losses . . . from his personal injuries 
[that] does not transform his losses into injuries to business or prop-
erty.”247 
 The court stated, moreover, that “[e]ven if the Court were to focus 
solely on the nature of the damages plaintiff sustained, rather than 
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on the nature of the injury inflicted, plaintiff’s losses still would not 
qualify as compensable injuries.”248 This was based on the court’s po-
sition that neither employment nor lost opportunity for employment 
fits within the definition of property.249 The court instead determined 
that only those things that can be owned or possessed are property.250 
A later decision, which held consistent with Walker, may have clari-
fied the court’s position by requiring that a plaintiff must at least al-
lege some out-of-pocket expenditure.251 
3. Evaluating Walker and Guerrero in Light of Relevant 
Precedent 
 Relevant analysis in resolving the conflict between Guerrero and 
Walker largely hinges on the significance of Oscar. This begs the pre-
liminary consideration, however, of whether Oscar itself was correct 
in light of prior Supreme Court precedent. 
(a)   Supreme Court Precedent 
 The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of 
whether lost employment or lost opportunities for employment are 
business or property under RICO, nor has it addressed whether the 
pecuniary losses associated with a personal injury are compensable. 
In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., however, the Court interpreted business 
or property in the Clayton Act to have restrictive significance.252 Con-
sistent with this construction, Justice Marshall, in his Sedima dis-
sent, interpreted RICO’s clause to exclude recovery for personal inju-
ries.253 The other express limitation was adopted in Holmes, holding 
that an injury under RICO must be the proximate cause of a defen-
dant’s racketeering offense.254  
 In terms of the first limitation, there is nothing in any Supreme 
Court decision that can be directly cited to as support for an exten-
sion of Justice Marshall’s dissent in Sedima to exclude recovery for 
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business or property injuries (for example, wages) that derive from 
personal injuries. The floodgate concerns alluded to in Holmes sug-
gest the need for such a limitation,255 yet it is unclear why Holmes it-
self, in adopting a proximate causation requirement, should not be 
seen as addressing this concern. 
 Additionally, there is some tension between Oscar and the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Radovich v. National Football League.256 In 
Radovich, the Court held that the plaintiff had standing to pursue 
his claim under the Clayton Act where his alleged injury was lost op-
portunities for employment.257 It is not clear whether the Court con-
sidered plaintiff’s lost opportunities as an injury to business or prop-
erty or whether, instead, the plaintiff’s claim of pecuniary loss was 
sufficient. Under either interpretation, Oscar appears to depart from 
Radovich.  
 If Radovich stands for a recognition of pecuniary loss as one to 
business or property, regardless of its derivation, Oscar clearly de-
parts from this position.258 On the other hand, while it did not ex-
pressly adopt a position with respect to the status of lost employ-
ment, it might nevertheless be argued that Oscar is also in tension 
with Radovich’s alternative interpretation (that lost employment 
constitutes an injury to business or property). Oscar did, after all, 
adopt the reasoning and results of cases from other circuits that 
categorically rejected lost employment as an injury to business or 
property.259 While Oscar did not expressly adopt the particular posi-
tion of these circuits, its unqualified reliance on their reasoning sug-
gests that it would have adopted their position if given the opportu-
nity. This, in fact, was precisely the presumption that the Walker 
court made in expressly rejecting Radovich.260  
 While the Radovich Court did not analyze the Clayton Act’s injury 
requirement, the mere fact that plaintiff’s injury was not an issue for 
the court casts some doubt on the determinations made in Oscar.261 
And while decisions interpreting the Clayton Act are not directly 
binding on courts construing RICO, the similar language and objec-
tives of the two acts provides a sound basis for using the interpreta-
tions of one to guide the other. In fact, this is exactly what the Ninth 
Circuit did in Oscar when it cited to Reiter as support for its restric-
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tive interpretation of RICO’s injury requirement.262 Presumably then, 
the Ninth Circuit must, at some point, find a means of reconciling its 
reliance on cases like Reiter and its implicit rejection of Radovich.  
(b)   Walker and Guerrero in Light of Oscar 
 Assuming that Oscar is entirely consistent with relevant Supreme 
Court precedent, the question is whether its reasoning is more 
closely followed in Guerrero or Walker. Here, the analysis is fairly 
straightforward; both courts recognized that Oscar required plaintiffs 
to plead tangible financial loss.263 Beyond this, however, the two deci-
sions clearly diverged, with Walker more closely adhering to Oscar. 
 For its part, the Walker court focused its reliance on Oscar on 
cases adopting the approach that economic losses derived from per-
sonal injuries are non-compensable.264 While Oscar did not explicitly 
adopt this approach, it came very close when it said that determining 
whether the economic consequences of personal injuries are “injuries 
to ‘business or property’” is a matter “best left to philosophers, not the 
federal judiciary.”265 Further, in holding that the plaintiff could not 
recover for an injury, in part, because it was ‘“like that claimed by [a] 
plaintiff in a personal injury action,’”266 the implication of Oscar ap-
peared to be, as the Walker court plainly asserted, that ‘“economic 
losses which derive . . . from a fundamentally personal injury’ are not 
compensable under RICO.”267 So, in its holding that losses flowing 
from false arrest are not compensable under RICO, Walker appears 
to square with Oscar.  
 On the other hand, the court in Guerrero did little to justify what 
appeared to be a departure from Oscar. Without analysis, the court 
rejected the defendants’ reliance on Oscar and instead cited to deci-
sions in other circuits.268 Because Oscar appears to stop short of 
plainly rejecting recovery for economic losses derived from personal 
injuries, Guerrero was perhaps not in express conflict with Oscar. 
However, unlike the Walker court, the court in Guerrero showed little 
interest in following the reasoning in Oscar. 
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 Regarding the significance of lost employment, Oscar was silent. 
However, Oscar’s requirement of tangible financial loss suggests the 
result that Walker reached—that lost employment or lost employ-
ment opportunities are not compensable. The financial losses in lost 
employment are, after all, hypothetical.269 In that sense, then, lost 
employment does not yield tangible losses in, for instance, the way 
that extortion clearly would.270  
 In Slade, this position may have been clarified somewhat—the 
court held that plaintiffs must plead some out-of-pocket expendi-
ture.271 Because this cannot be satisfied through wages and employ-
ment opportunities never realized, neither would be cognizable under 
RICO. Curiously, Guerrero cautioned that only tangible losses could 
be recovered but, at the same time, held that lost employment or lost 
opportunities for employment were cognizable injuries even though 
both classes of injury are only tangible in a purely hypothetical 
sense.272 The court did not attempt to resolve this difficulty. 
B.   Interpreting Section 1964(c)’s Injury Requirement in Light of 
RICO’s Plain Language and Legislative Purpose 
 In the absence of controlling Supreme Court precedent, interpre-
tations of RICO’s injury to business or property restriction ought to 
be consistent with its plain meaning and Congress’s intent in enact-
ing RICO. This is a formula that the Supreme Court has closely ad-
hered to in interpreting other provisions of RICO, resulting in the re-
jection of several efforts to limit standing under RICO.273  
 Section 1964(c) states that “[a]ny person injured in his business or 
property” as the result of a RICO predicate offense may sue to re-
cover their losses.274 In Guerrero and Walker, there were two possible 
theories for satisfying this requirement: lost employment or lost 
wages. Unlike interpretation of other parts of RICO, such as its ap-
plication to any person, determining the meaning of property is not so 
easily susceptible to common understanding. Centuries of legal and 
metaphysical speculation have failed to produce a definitive view,275 
so it is not at all surprising, then, that courts and legal scholars dif-
fer over its definition within the context of RICO.  
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 Determining who has gotten the better of whom in a metaphysical 
tug-of-war is beyond the scope of this Comment—the key determina-
tion here is not so much what is property for every circumstance, but 
rather what it should be under RICO. One way out of this interpre-
tive dilemma is to rely, as the Walker court did, on state law for 
guidance.276 But, while this may be effective in sparing judges from 
inquiries better left to philosophers, it is unclear why state statutes 
or state court decisions should have a bearing on interpretation of a 
statute dealing with problems of national concern. An arguably bet-
ter and certainly less arbitrary approach is instead to interpret 
RICO’s injury requirement in a way that gives civil RICO the effect 
that Congress intended. Quite simply then, the critical question is 
whether Congress intended to remedy the type of injuries that the 
plaintiffs in Guerrero and Walker suffered. 
1. Applying RICO to the LAPD in Light of Its Fundamental 
Objectives 
 In enacting RICO, Congress essentially had three purposes in 
mind. First, it wanted to curb the destructive impact of organized 
crime on the American economy.277 Secondly, it sought to prevent in-
filtration of legitimate enterprises by criminal actors.278 And third, 
with regard to civil RICO in particular, it wanted to give racketeer-
ing victims some means of compensating their injuries.279 
(a)   Protecting American Economic Life 
 As to Congress’s first concern, the Supreme Court has been very 
clear—RICO is not limited to organized crime.280 Thus, Congress’s 
purpose might instead be viewed more broadly, as curbing the influ-
ence of systematic racketeering activity on the American economy—
no matter who engages in it.281 As discussed earlier, the allegations of 
misconduct in the Rampart CRASH unit clearly satisfy the type of 
racketeering pattern that Congress had in mind in enacting RICO.282 
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The only question left, then, is: Whether the activity of an entity like 
the LAPD has the potential to negatively impact American economic 
life in ways that RICO was designed to address? Surely, both in what 
it has done (for example, narcotics dealing) and what it has failed to 
do (for example, not arresting narcotics dealers), the LAPD’s miscon-
duct has surely had some impact on economic life in Los Angeles. 
While Los Angeles economic life is not American economic life, the 
aggregate impact of similar offenses committed by officers in other 
cities undoubtedly has a substantial negative impact on American 
economic life. The analysis is no different than if we were to consider 
the impact of one small, isolated mobster versus that of the entire 
mob generally. If courts are willing to apply RICO to the mobster, 
then there is little substance to the contention that injuries suffered 
from police misconduct are not what RICO was designed to redress. 
Both the mobster and the police department are engaged in activities 
that, when aggregated with the same offenses committed by all mob-
sters and police departments, adversely affect the national economy. 
(b)   Preventing the Infiltration of Legitimate Enterprises 
 In terms of preventing the criminal infiltration of legitimate en-
terprises, the LAPD is perhaps an ideal object of RICO coverage. Af-
ter all, it is hard to imagine there ever being more of a stake in pre-
serving the legitimacy of an enterprise than when it concerns the 
very institutions entrusted to protect citizens from criminals. 
(c)   Redressing Private Injuries 
 Finally, there is the issue of redressing private injuries caused by 
racketeering. If plaintiffs’ allegations are true that defendants’ rack-
eteering activity was clearly the cause of their injuries. These inju-
ries, then, are, generally speaking, precisely what RICO was de-
signed to compensate: private injuries resulting from prohibited 
racketeering activity. However, as discussed earlier and as with any 
litigation, there must be some restrictions on the injuries for which 
parties may recover.283 For now, though, it is worth noting that, as a 
general matter, the principal objectives of RICO are satisfied as ap-
plied to police misconduct like that at issue in Guerrero and Walker. 
2. Interpreting RICO’s Limitations in Light of Its Fundamental 
Objectives 
 There are two principal limitations on recoveries under RICO. 
One such limitation is built into the statute—only injuries to busi-
ness or property are compensable. Thus, plaintiffs could not, for in-
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stance, recover for their pain and suffering. Additionally, there is the 
standard limitation of proximate causation. The injuries alleged in 
Guerrero and Walker, however, do not fall within either of these two 
basic limitations. 
(a)   Injury to Business or Property 
 Plaintiffs in Guerrero and Walker claimed financial losses due to 
lost employment.284 This type of loss does not constitute a personal 
injury, but instead is, in the strictest sense, an injury to property. As 
the Supreme Court noted in Reiter: “[T]he word ‘property’ has a 
naturally broad and inclusive meaning. In its dictionary definitions 
and in common usage ‘property’ comprehends anything of material 
value owned or possessed. Money, of course, is a form of property.”285 
Thus, the business or property limitation, absent some additional re-
striction, is not enough to preclude plaintiffs’ recovery under RICO. 
 Of course, it can be stated that the plaintiffs’ loss was not tangible 
because their claims of lost wages were, in a sense, hypothetical. 
Why this is necessarily relevant, however, is not at all clear, particu-
larly if the courts’ objective is to effect the intent of RICO. First, 
permitting claims like those in Guerrero and Walker to proceed 
would surely have at least some deterrent effect on the economically 
destructive racketeering activity of police departments. To instead 
require an allegation of some out-of-pocket expenditure ignores this 
purpose. This would, for instance, allow plaintiffs to collect if they 
proved that defendant officers stole fifty dollars from their wallets 
but deny recovery for potentially thousands of dollars or more in lost 
income. Surely, the latter type of loss has a greater impact on Ameri-
can economic life. It makes no sense, then, to categorically preclude 
the latter from civil RICO while including the former.  
 For similar reasons, an out-of-pocket expenditures requirement is 
also inconsistent with the aim of protecting legitimate enterprises 
from criminal infiltration. To impose arbitrary limitations on recov-
eries under RICO limits the liability for offending parties and thus 
removes a disincentive to infiltrate legitimate entities like the LAPD. 
Finally, denying compensation for the loss of one’s livelihood, simply 
because it does not constitute an out-of-pocket expenditure, is clearly 
inconsistent with RICO’s objective of giving private parties some 
means of compensating their injuries. As already discussed, the im-
pact of lost income on racketeering victims is potentially much more 
severe than that suffered through out-of-pocket expenditures.  
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 Even if money is property, however, Walker held that tangible 
losses flowing from a fundamentally personal injury are not com-
pensable.286 It is unclear, though, why the underlying source of the 
injury should matter any more than whether there is an out-of-
pocket loss suffered. Even under Justice Marshall’s dissent in 
Sedima, only personal injuries are excluded from RICO coverage; it 
stated nothing regarding property losses that flow from personal in-
juries.287 To illustrate the strained logic of Walker, consider the fol-
lowing example: A pizza shop owner owes his bookie money. The 
bookie tries to make good, but the shop owner never has enough to 
pay him. So, the bookie, using his connections as part of a major or-
ganized crime syndicate, decides to put a hit out on the shop owner 
(something he has done many times in his ten-year career as a 
bookie). The hitman walks into the pizza shop, fires at the shop 
owner but barely grazes his head. Thinking the shop owner is dead, 
the hitman walks away. The trauma to the shop owner’s head causes 
him to pass out. When he finally wakes up, his shop is in flames be-
cause the pizza ovens had been on too long. He rushes out of the shop 
in time to save his life, but his uninsured shop is gone forever. 
 Presumably, under Walker, the shop owner would recover nothing 
under RICO. His underlying injury was fundamentally personal: a 
graze to the head. The loss of his shop was the consequence of this in-
jury, so he could recover nothing under the standard of no recovery 
for tangible losses flowing from personal injuries. This is despite the 
fact that, in the example, there was clearly a RICO offense, a pattern 
of racketeering activity, and certainly an injury to property. Such a 
result simply does not comport with RICO’s policy objectives.  
 On the other hand, there is the difficulty that arises when per-
sonal and economic injuries are intertwined.288 This is only a prob-
lem, however, if the two categories of injuries cannot be segregated to 
honor the restrictive significance of RICO’s injury to business or 
property requirement. In the example above and, more importantly, 
in Guerrero and Walker, no such difficulty arises. In each case, claims 
can clearly be limited to purely economic injuries. Because in many 
cases this is easily achieved, it makes little sense to categorically 
preclude recovery for any injury derivative of an underlying personal 
injury.  
 Instead, by limiting the analysis to whether an injury to business 
or property has resulted from a prohibited RICO predicate offense 
(regardless of whether it also resulted in a non-cognizable personal 
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injury), courts would both effect RICO’s intent as well as avoid specu-
lative philosophical inquiry. For instance, courts would not have to 
determine whether employment is property—rather, their judgment 
would focus entirely on whether there was some causal nexus be-
tween plaintiffs’ loss of money (or some other property) and their al-
legation of a RICO predicate offense. 
 Surely, though, there must be some limits on RICO recoveries. If 
ten years from now, plaintiffs in Guerrero and Walker were to claim 
lost wages for the period since they were first imprisoned because the 
damage to their psyches prevented them from effectively interview-
ing for jobs, this would raise a number of legitimate concerns. This 
problem, though, is precisely what the court in Holmes addressed 
when it adopted a proximate causation standard for civil RICO.289 
(b)  Containing RICO as an Administrative Matter—Proximate 
Causation 
 If it is simply a matter of containing the expansion of RICO as an 
administrative matter, it is unclear why proximate causation does 
not adequately perform this function. As earlier noted, proximate 
causation has essentially two components: policy objectives and ad-
ministrative concerns.290 The first is clearly not at issue—allowing 
plaintiffs to proceed on their claims would directly effect RICO’s goal 
of deterring the corrupt and economically destructive impact of sys-
tematic racketeering activity like that which has been engaged in by 
the Rampart CRASH unit. The second component is not an obstacle 
either. Plaintiffs are clearly the most direct victims of their own false 
imprisonment. Calculation of their losses would, moreover, merely be 
a matter of determining their lost wages over the period they were 
incarcerated—not the type of calculation to which the courts are un-
accustomed. In weeding out those who suffer indirect, incalculable 
injuries, there is simply no legitimate justification for not leaving in 
those who, like the plaintiffs in Walker and Guerrero, are directly in-
jured in ways that are conducive to precise calculation.  
VII.   CONCLUSION: WHITHER RICO? 
Reaching into his bag and taking out a stone . . . .291 
 In defending RICO’s application outside the context of organized 
crime, one of its original drafters has remarked: “RICO is not a mon-
ster. It is [instead] the slingshot the Davids of this world can use to 
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have a fair fight with the Goliaths . . . .”292 The Supreme Court has 
been clear—the application of RICO is not limited to organized 
crime. In being applied to almost every type of enterprise, however, a 
fairly common thread does emerge among RICO’s targets. They tend 
to be institutions so large and pervasive in their influence that their 
power to negatively impact the lives of private citizens is enormous. 
The function of RICO, then, is simply to balance the scales—whether 
the targeted entity is the mob or a police department is unimportant. 
 Rather, few contexts provide a more compelling justification for 
leveling the playing field than in the area of police misconduct. There 
is perhaps no greater imbalance in power than one where a political 
minority is at the mercy of an institution entrusted with authority to 
deprive them of their liberties. Arguably, this is an imbalance much 
greater than the one that Richard Nixon and members of Congress 
had in mind thirty years ago. Even at the height of its powers, the 
mob never enjoyed the one thing that makes police departments so 
potentially dangerous: a presumption of legitimacy. Moreover, unlike 
police misconduct, organized crime was (and is) clearly a concern of 
the politically and economically relevant. Fundamentally, then, 
RICO is, if anything, more suited to redressing the misconduct of po-
lice departments than the brand of activity that originally preoccu-
pied its enactors.  
 After all, where are the Davids of this world but in cities like Los 
Angeles where civil liberties and economic well-being are threatened 
by the very institutions entrusted to protect them. If ever RICO was 
to be used in a way that is consistent with its scale-balancing func-
tion, it is in the hands of minorities against Goliath-like enterprises 
such as the LAPD. After Walker, however, little room has been left 
for such an application. For the time being, then, it appears that the 
Davids of this world must continue in search of a stone worthy of 
their adversary. 
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